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Abstract: Problem statement: Flaws either in users’ implementation of a network or in the standard 
specification of protocols has resulted in gaps that allow various kinds of network attack to be 
launched. Of the kinds of network attacks, denial-of-service flood attacks have caused the most severe 
impact. Approach: This study reviews recent researches on flood attacks and their mitigation, 
classifying such attacks as either high-rate flood or low-rate flood. Finally, the attacks are compared 
against criteria related to their characteristics, methods and impacts. Results: Denial-of-service flood 
attacks vary in their rates, traffic, targets, goals and impacts. However, they have general similarities 
that are the methods used are flooding and the main purpose is to achieve denial of service to the 
target. Conclusion/Recommendations: Mitigation of the denial-of-service flood attacks must 
correspond to the attack rates, traffic, targets, goals and impacts in order to achieve effective solution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Flooding distributed denial of service attacks are 
the attacks launched by multiple attackers through the 
action of flooding, i.e. sending traffics in a quantity that 
is able to bring a network or a service down. 
Distributed denial of service (DDoS) flood attacks have 
been among the most frequently occurring attacks and 
badly threaten the reliability and usability of the 
services of the Internet. Hence, DDoS flood attacks 
(hereafter flood attacks) present severe threats to 
individuals, business organizations and even political 
entities such as a country. Reported impacts of DDoS 
floods include disgruntled customers, losses of business 
profits, disruption of critical infrastructures such as 
train operations and Internet disconnection of a country 
from the outside world. 
 The problem of flood attacks has been studied 
extensively in order to anticipate new attacks and to 
solve problems caused by the attacks. Studies of flood 
attacks also reveal that attacks are caused not only by 
vulnerabilities in network implementation, but also by 
flaws in protocol specifications and in the Internet 
system architecture. This research triggers even more 
research on improvements and innovations to the current 
network mechanisms in order to prevent flood attacks. 
 This study reviews recent publications on flood 
attack research. Flood attacks are categorized into 
high rate flood and low rate flood. This study is 
organized as follows: Introduction introduces the topic 
and important terms used in this study. Result and 
discussions reviews and compares high rate flood 
attacks and low rate flood attacks, respectively. 
Conclusion concludes the study. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Distributed denial of service: The most direct 
definition of DoS comes from International 
Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) recommendation 
X.800as: “The prevention of authorized access to 
resources or the delaying of time-critical operations” 
(ITU, 1991). 
 In the context of information systems, a DoS attack 
happens when an attacker explicitly attempts to prevent 
a service from being used by its legitimate users 
through many ways including by flooding a network 
with useless traffic to prevent legitimate network traffic 
(CERT, 1997). Among the area affected by DoS attacks 
are electronic information systems (Curran and Nichols 
2005) and wireless sensor network (Hanapi et al., 
2009). 
 A DoS victim will be more affected by the attack 
if the amount of flood traffic is bigger. An attacker 
achieves this through launching the distributed DoS 
attack. DDoS attack is a DoS attack that employs 
multiple attacking entities to achieve denial of 
service at the victim site (Jelena and Reiher, 2004), 
called zombies (Xia, Lu and Tang, 2010), bots 
(Michael et al., 2010), or slaves (Safa et al., 2008).  
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Fig. 1: Distributed denial of service attack 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Classification of DDoS flood attack 
 
The zombies, bots or slaves are multiple hosts, which 
may be hundreds or thousands of Internet-connected 
computers located anywhere in the world. The 
employed army have earlier been compromised or 
commandeered by the attacker (master) to direct 
massive traffic to overwhelm the victim without their 
own awareness (Li et al., 2009), (Michael et al., 
2010). Figure 1 illustrates the DDoS flood attack. 
 A DDoS flood hence is launched to deny 
legitimate users or significantly degrade the 
performance of service rather than breaking into the 
victim’s site (Li, 2006). 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
Flood attack: From the introduction, it is known that 
flooding is the method used in order to launch a DDoS 
attack. The distributed nature of the Internet and other 
distributed systems such as openness, resource sharing 
and accessibility gives unfair advantages to the attacker 
(Li et al., 2009). As the Internet servers process all 
queries without being able to recognize bad clients from 
good clients from the request alone, the victim will 
waste its resources by processing the false requests sent 
by the army of attackers until it gets overwhelmed 
(Michael et al., 2010). The attack process is a relatively 
simple, yet very powerful technique to attack the 
Internet resources (Xia et al., 2010). 
 Although it seems that bigger amount of flood will 
cause more severe impact to the victim, the more 
sophisticated attackers have devised other flooding 
techniques which require smaller amount of flood 
traffics. These flooding techniques are known as low 
rate flooding. Due to this, this article classifies DDoS 
flooding as high rate flood attack and low rate flood 
attack as illustrated in Figure 2 and further elaborated in 
the following topics. 
 
High rate flood attacks: Originally, flood attacks are 
high rate flood. This is accomplished by generating 
traffics from many machines, which may number 
thousands, distributed all over the world. Bombards of 
the flood packets from the attackers will overwhelm the 
target hence degrading its performance to the extent of 
rendering it unusable.  
 The high rate flood attacks reviewed in this study 
are the UDP attacks and TCP attacks. They are 
categorized as high rate flood attacks because the 
attacks are launched by flooding a massive amount of 
TCP or UDP datagrams to overwhelm the victim. 
 Li et al. (2008), quantitative behaviors of flood 
attacks under different protocols and intensities were 
studied through simulations using ns2. Quantitative 
behavior of the attacks become the focus in (Li et al., 
2008) in order to describe the attacks quantitatively 
due to the scarcity of traffic data of the real attack 
events. The reason is that in many events of attacks, 
they will only be reported after the target machines 
are already overwhelmed and traffic data is lost. 
 The study observed that both types of TCP and UDP 
attacks carried out did not affect UDP clients but were 
able to cause TCP clients to drop legitimate packets. 
 The connection-oriented nature of the TCP clients 
means the receiving end will inform the transmission 
node to reduce its transmission rate if it exceeds its 
receiving ability. This makes the TCP clients to be 
more vulnerable to bandwidth attacks compared to 
UDP clients. 
 While UDP-type attacks aim at consuming the link 
bandwidth, the TCP-type attacks are usually launched 
to exhaust resources at the victim site. Under the same 
attack intensity, UDP attacks are more severe in terms 
of its ability to cause more degradation of legitimate 
traffics (Mirkovic et al., 2009), (Li et al., 2008). 
However, TCP attacks are more common because 80% 
of Internet traffic is based on TCP (Maciá-Fernández, 
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Díaz-Verdejo and García-Teodoro, 2009). Hence, more 
than 90% of DoS attacks exploit the TCP (Chen and 
He, 2008), (Yu et al., 2008). 
 
Low rate flood attacks: Contrary to the high rate flood, 
low rate flood uses carefully crafted attack packets. The 
attack traffic rate is adjusted in order to make them 
undetected by the traditional flood detector which 
regards high rate of incoming traffic as attack.  
 Four low rate flood attacks are reviewed in this 
study: Low rate DoS attack against application servers 
(LoRDAS) (Maciá-Fernández et al., 2009), Shrew 
attack (Chang et al., 2009), Induced-shrew attack 
(Kumar et al., 2009) and Quiet attack (Shevtekar and 
Ansari, 2009).  
 
Low Rate DoS attack against Application Servers 
(LoRDAS): LoRDAS (Maciá-Fernández et al., 2009) is 
an evolution of low rate DoS attack against iterative 
servers which extends its ability against concurrent 
systems. Taking advantage of the capacity of 
application servers, the attack traffic is intelligently sent 
in order to make the server busy attending the requests 
of the attacker, hence reducing its ability to attend to 
legitimate clients’ requests. 
 This attack exploits the servers’ capacity to 
forecast the instance at which the responses to incoming 
requests for a given service occur. 
 
Shrew attack: Shrew attack (Aleksandra and Knightly, 
2003) is designed to stealthily deny bandwidth of a TCP 
flow. An attack burst, which is a short pulse of high 
intensity traffic, gives illusion to TCP that the link is 
highly congested. The target router buffer is filled up; 
causing packet drops (Kumar et al., 2009). If within a 
window of transmitted packet a certain amount of 
packets are dropped, the transmission is suspended for a 
Retransmission Time-Out (RTO) period (Fall and Floyd, 
1996). After the RTO expires, the next retransmission 
however will encounter another attack bursts as the 
Shrew attack interval is synchronized to the RTO value; 
causing another drop. This will happen continuously in a 
successful Shrew attack until the throughput is reduced 
to almost zero or the session is closed or reset.  
 The strength of the Shrew attack is the rate of the 
attack flow is low enough that it can escape detection by 
traditional DoS detectors. As for the attack time interval, 
it can be easily synchronized to the RTO of the TCP flow 
because most TCP implementations use fixed minimum 
RTO value (Chang et al., 2009), (Kumar et al., 2009).  
 Among the works proposed to mitigate the Shrew 
attacks are using Active Queue Management (AQM) 
(Aleksandra and Knightly, 2003), taking drop history of 
each flow into account (Mahajan et al., 2001), 
randomizing the fixed minimum RTO in TCP 
parameter in to make the synchronized attack more 
difficult, router-based detection using auto-correlation, 
fair resource allocation, detection at edge routers, 
halting anomaly with weighted choking, frequency 
domain spectrum analysis, wavelet-based approach, 
Shrew attack protection techniques based on signal 
analysis (Yu, Kai and Yu-Kwong, 2005), (Xiapu and 
Chang, 2005) and simple priority-tagging filtering 
mechanism (Chang et al., 2009). 
 
Induced-shrew attack: Unlike the Shrew attack in 
which the attacker sends direct flood, the Induced-shrew 
attacker, as a master, controls a remote host, as a slave, to 
be the source for launching low rate flood attacks. The 
slaved remote host must be a TCP sender such as the 
Internet web and ftp servers (Kumar et al., 2009).  
 The attack is made possible by the shortcomings in 
the standard of TCP congestion control process in 
which it is the TCP receiver who controls the data 
transmission rate and pattern, yet lack of a mechanism 
to ensure that the receiver obeys the standard.  
 To launch the attack, an attacker establishes a 
connection with a slave e.g., a web server and initiates, 
e.g., a file download through the normal three-way 
handshake. After receiving the first data packet, the 
attacker (TCP receiver) starts sending optimistic ACKs 
to the slave (TCP sender). Optimistic ACK is a 
mechanism done by a greedy receiver to extract data 
from the sender faster than a standard receiver. In 
optimistic ACKing, the receiver sends ACK to data 
which the sender is expected to send in response to its 
previous ACKs. The receiver sends a series of ACKs in 
which the ACK number of successive ACK packets is 
incremented. The overall traffic is maintained low by 
sending the ACKs in batches with high inter-batch gap. 
The optimistic ACKing done by the attacker made the 
response traffic from the web server will flood its 
Internet access router with low rate flood. As a TCP 
transmission is controlled by the receiver, the attacker 
as the receiver now controls the sender as the attack 
slave. The TCP sender starts, stops and change 
transmission rate as instructed by the attacker. 
 To mitigate the Induced-shrew attack, RTO 
randomization can also be used, as applicable to 
Shrew (Kumar et al., 2009). Other proposals include a 
challenge-response mechanism by the TCP sender to 
the TCP receiver to validate incoming ACKs (Savage 
et al., 1999) and the cumulative nonce scheme (Kumar 
et al., 2009). 
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Table 1: Comparison of flooding DDoS attacks 
Attack name UDP flood  TCP flood  LoRDAS Shrew  Induced-shrew  Quiet  
Attack rate High High Low Low Low Low 
Attack traffic UDP flow TCP flow No info TCP flow Optimistic  Short-lived 
     ACK packets TCP flows 
Attack target UDP or UDP or Application Routers in Internet access Routers in 
 TCP clients TCP clients servers TCP flows routers  TCP flows 
Attack goal Exhaust resources Consume DoS: reduce availability Deny bandwidth DoS at Internet Reduce 
 at target machine bandwidth  of servers to serve to TCP flows, access routers throughput 
   legitimate users close session    
 
Quiet attack: The Quiet attack (Shevtekar and Ansari, 
2009) is a stealthy DDoS attack that can significantly 
reduce the throughput of a TCP flow. It uses botnets to 
launch short-lived TCP flows disguised as legitimate 
traffics. As the short-lived TCP flows are injected 
persistently undetected as attack, the victim ISP is made 
to believe that the routers are in a real congestion. Like 
the Induced-shrew, the Quiet attack also originates from 
the underlying shortfall in the TCP specification, 
specifically the end to end window flow control. 
 The Quiet attack is executed as follows: 
 
• Reconnaissance phase: decide a botnet, a target 
router, web servers and a network feedback 
mechanism 
• Execution phase: a set of bots are instructed to 
request web pages from web servers at an interval 
T, a random number between 0-1s 
• Using network feedback control, the attacker 
gathers network feedback from the target router at 
every threshold (e.g., more than 1Kbps in 5 sec) to 
add more attack traffic 
 
 Experiments in (Shevtekar and Ansari, 2009) 
shows that the Quiet attack cannot be mitigated by 
mechanisms used to mitigate Shrew, Reduction of 
Quality, TCP Vs TCP, typical DDoS, UDP flood, or 
ICMP flood; due to the different properties of the attack 
(See the next topic for comparisons). Hence, botnet 
mitigation such as better CAPTCHAs is suggested as 
the defense strategy for the attack. 
 
Comparison between attacks: The six attacks 
introduced above are compared in Table 1 above in 
terms of attack rate, attack traffic, attack target, attack 
goal and attack impact. 
 
Attack rates: The attack rates are categorized into two. 
UDP flood and TCP flood are high-rate flood attacks, 
whereas other attacks reviewed in this study are low-
rate flood attacks.  
 
Attack traffics: Most of the traffics used to launch the 
attacks reviewed in this study are TCP traffics, except 
UDP flood attacks. This is due to the nature that 80% of 
all Internet traffics are TCP traffics.  
Attack targets: Flood attacks reviewed here target 
either client machines, servers or routers. While the 
high-rate TCP and UDP attacks target network clients 
and the LoRDAS attack targets network application 
servers, the Shrew and Quiet attacks target routers in 
TCP flows. Meanwhile, the Induced-shrew attack 
targets Internet access routers, as the attacker is the 
machine that receives the TCP connection assisted by a 
slaved TCP sender machine. 
 
Attack goals: All flood attacks are aimed at causing 
denial of service at the targets by exhausting them. 
High-rate UDP flood attack exhausts the resources at 
client machines while high-rate TCP flood floods the 
bandwidth in the network of a TCP client. 
 Low-rate flood attacks, in the other hand, still 
cause denial of service at the target, even with a lower 
degree of flooding. An application server which is the 
target of a LoRDAS attack will not entertain clients’ 
requests other than the attacker. A Shrew attacker can 
cause session close and bandwidth deny by 
continuously causes the router to drop packets 
following injection of attack traffic at a particular 
interval. An Internet access routers attacked by an 
Induced-shrew attack is overpowered by the TCP 
sender and receiver that execute the attack, hence will 
route, change transmission rate, or stop routing 
according to instructions from the attacker. The Quiet 
attack causes reduction in the throughput of the real 
traffic through injection of attack traffic in a random 
interval, which in turn gives illusion of a real 
congestion at the routers involved. 
 
Attack impacts: All flood attacks cause severe impacts 
at the victim side. In the high-rate flood attacks, the 
UDP flood attack causes more degradation of the 
legitimate traffic than the same intensity of a TCP flood 
attack. This is because the UDP flood attack exhausts 
the resources at the target client machines due to its 
connectionless nature. As for the low-rate flood attacks, 
the impacts of each attack vary according to factors 
such as the intensity of the attack and attack duration. 
As the goal of each attack also varies, comparison on 
the impact of the attacks must be made based on the 
similarities of the goal each attack is about to achieve. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This study has reviewed six flooding attacks 
studied in recent years. Most of the flood attacks 
reviewed in this study are the new breed of flood 
attacks which are more stealthy yet cause more severe 
impacts of denial of service, such as those attacks 
categorized under the low-rate DoS attacks. 
 Future works include more thorough studies of the 
flood attacks existing both in IPv4 and IPv6 
environments in preparation for the transition to IPv6. 
A new technique to mitigate one of the flood attacks is 
to be proposed based on the research conducted.  
 In order to carry out these tasks, experiments will 
be carried out both in simulation and test bed 
environments. Details related to attacks and their 
impacts will be collected, compared and analyzed. 
 Next, a model of attack mitigation will be 
designed based on the characteristics of one attack. 
This model will then be implemented on a network 
and will be tested thoroughly, where improvements 
will be made as needed. 
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